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tirely on how the trial judge conducts the determination of whether the
defendant's waiver is valid. In Moran's case, a more thorough examina-
tion most probably would have uncovered the extenuating circumstances
surrounding Moran's guilty plea and waiver of counsel.
Virginia rule of criminal procedure 3A:8, which essentially mirrors
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, codifies the Boykin require-
ments. 25 Form 6, included in the Virginia rules, ensures that a thorough
record of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the guilty plea is on
the record. That form includes twenty-four detailed (suggested) ques-
tions to be asked by the judge to an accused who pleads guilty. Assuming
that the defendant is alert and fully understands the judge's inquiries, the
form questions should protect the defendant's rights under Boykin.
26
Defense counsel representing an individual like Moran, impaired
by drugs or by mental illness, have special responsibilities. The Model
Code of Professional Responsibility states: "Any mental or physical
condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered
judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his
lawyer ..."27 Counsel in such a criminal case assumes the role of a
25 "A circuit court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences
of the plea." Virginia rule of criminal procedure 3A:8(b).
26 The Supreme Court of Virginia held a defendant's guilty plea
under Boykin invalid in Gardner v. Warden of the Virginia State
Penitentiaiy, 222 Va. 491,281 S.E.2d 876(1981). In that case, defendant
agreed to plead guilty to murder in return for a sentence of thirty years
imprisonment and a five year suspended sentence. He was told to
respond negatively should the judge ask if his plea was based on a deal
with the Commonwealth's attorney. Not having been previously con-
sulted, the trial judge accepted the guilty plea and sentenced defendant
to sixty years with ten years suspended. The supreme court reversed the
trial court holding that it was clear that under the circumstances that the
guilty plea by the defendant had not been entered into intelligently and
knowingly, and that the defendant should have had an opportunity to
quasi-guardian as well as an advocate. 28 Although the client may be
incapacitated, an attorney still has a responsibility to consider his wishes.
As the comment to Model Rule 1.14 states: "[A] client lacking legal
competence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and
reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being..
.-29 While counsel must take into consideration the wishes of his
partially incapacitated client, he must not stray from his ultimate duty to
act in the best interests of his client.
Finally, one of the most important lessons anyone acquainted with
Moran must take away with them is the importance of discouraging pleas
of guilty to capital murder unless a sentence other than death is assured.
30
The appellate process as it now stands often will make such decisions
irrevocable. Moran is a clear example of how the true contentions of a
defendant may be distorted in the appellate process. A defendant like
Moran who emerges from a drug induced haze, may not be given the
opportunity to withdraw his plea.
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withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 495, 281 S.E.2d at 878.
For other Virginia decisions applying Boykin, see, e.g., Burton v.
Peyton, 210 Va. 484, 489, 171 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1970)(upholding
validity of guilty plea based on Boykin); Miracle v. Peyton, 211 Va. 123,
126, 176 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1970)(same); Anderson v. Warden, 222 Va.
511,515,281 S.E.2d 885,888 (1981)(noting inter alia that the "purpose
of the [Boykin] examination on the record is to forestall 'the spin-off of
collateral proceedings'... ." (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244)).
27 Model Code of Professional Responsibility E.C. 7-12.
28 See Henderson, Presenting Mitigation Against the Client's
Wishes: A Moral or Professional Imperative?, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
29 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14, cmt. 1.
30 See Commonwealth v. Dubois, 435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993), and
case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
JOHNSON v. TEXAS
113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On March 23, 1986, nineteen year-old Dorsie Lee Johnson and a
friend, Amanda Miles, robbed a convenience store in Snyder, Texas.
Johnson shot and killed the clerk, Jack Huddleston. A few weeks after
the crime, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted
murder of a store clerk in Colorado City, Texas. At that time, Johnson
confessed to Jack Huddleston's murder and the robbery in Snyder. The
homicide qualified as a capital offense underTexas law becauseJohnson
intentionally or knowingly caused the clerk's death and the murder
occurred in the commission of a robbery.
1
I Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.02(a)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1989).
See case summary of Graham v. Collins, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5,
No. 2, p. 8 (1993). Cf. Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(4).
2 At the time of Johnson's trial, the Texas capital-sentencing statute
contained two "special issues" for the jury to consider:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
During the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial, the State pre-
sented a variety of evidence to establish future dangerousness, cover-
ing a time period from an incident in the third grade when Johnson
stabbed a classmate with a pencil, to six days after Huddleston's
murder when Johnson fired two shots at a man outside a Snyder
restaurant, and culminating with testimony from a sheriff's deputy in
a jail where Johnson was being held, stating that Johnson had threat-
ened to "get" the deputy when he was released. In contrast, the sole
witness in mitigation for the defense was Johnson's father, who
testified that an eighteen or nineteen year-old does not fully evaluate
his conduct in the same way as an olderperson. Johnson was sentenced
to death.2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
3
of the deceased was committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result; (2) whether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the
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Five days after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruling, the
United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh.
4
Johnson's motion for rehearing in the appeals court was granted. John-
son argued that the Texas capital-sentencing statute did not allow a jury
to adequately give effect to mitigating evidence of youth. The court
rejected the argument on its merits, finding that the jury was able to
express a reasoned moral response to mitigating evidence within the
scope of Texas Criminal Procedure Code Article 37.071 instructions.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the future dangerousness special issue allowed the jury to give adequate
mitigating effect to evidence of defendant's youth.
HOLDING
On direct review, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. The
Court ruled that the jury would be able to consider both the potential lack
of maturity of defendant and the potential for lessened moral culpability
for his actions.5 The Court rejected Johnson's arguments that the Eighth
Amendment, particularly as interpreted in Penry v. Lynaugh, required a




Johnson is the first case in which the Court has considered, on the
merits, the issue of whether a Texas jury could fully consider and give
effect to all mitigating aspects of youth. 7 In Johnson's case, the United
States Supreme Court distinguished the defendant's situation from that
of the defendant in Penry v. Lynaugh. In Penry, the Court concluded that
the jury would view Penry's mental retardation only as tending to prove
the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. Therefore an additional
instruction was necessary to permit the jury to consider, and if it wished,
give effect to the potential mitigating character of retardation as lessen-
ing moral culpability on the part of the defendant. The Penry court ruled
that the Texas sentencing scheme limited the jury's ability to consider
defendant's mental retardation, as "[t]he jury was never instructed that
it could consider the evidence offered by Penry as mitigating evidence
evidence, whether the defendant's act was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981). The death
sentence was mandatory if the jury unanimously answered all three
issues affirmatively. In effect, those three issues essentially boiled down
to one question regarding future dangerousness.
In 1991, the Texas legislature amended this statute in response to the
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Now, if the jury
answers in the affirmative to all three questions, the court must instruct
the jury to determine "[w]hether, taking into consideration all of the
evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's
character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the
defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances
to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death
sentence be imposed." Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. art. 37.071(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1992-1993).
3 Johnson v. Texas, 773 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
4 492 U.S. 302.
5 Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2669-70 (1993).
6 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that sentencer
must not preclude presentation and consideration of evidence in mitiga-
tion that is relevant); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding
that sentencer must consider all of the mitigating evidence that the
defendant offers); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (ruling that jury
must be able to give effect to mitigation evidence).
7 The issue of whether or not the future dangerousness question
and that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence in imposing
sentence."
8
In Johnson, the Court applied the test developed in Boyde 1'.
California,9 and found that "there is no reasonable likelihood that the
jury would have found itself foreclosed from considering the relevant
aspects of petitioner's youth."'10 The Court in Johnson held that there
was not the same double-edged sword regarding youth as there had been
with mental retardation evidence in Penry, as any evidence of youth
would not automatically be seen as aggravating. The Court stated that
"[ihf any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth
made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood
that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from consid-
ering that in evaluating petitioner's future dangerousness."tI1 The Court
also concluded that the Penry problem did not arise in Johnson because
the Texas statute included a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that
included defendant's age, while there was no such reference to mental
retardation. 12
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor explained that the requirement that
mitigation evidence be relevant to the issue of future dangerousness does
not permit the jury to give full effect to youth as a mitigating factor,
although youth may be considered for some purposes (i.e., youth will
grow out of their violent behavior as they grow older).' 3 However, the
"lessened moral culpability" aspect of youth has nothing todowith future
dangerousness. Justice O'Connor correctly explained that "not one of
the special issues under the former Texas scheme... allows ajury to give
effect to the most relevant mitigating aspect of youth: its relation to a
defendant's 'culpability for the crime he committed'.- '14 The concept of
"lessened moral culpability" is that certain classes of people will be
deemed less blameworthy for their actions than would members of other
classes who engaged in similar conduct. The decision is made by
members of society that for one reason or another, certain people will not
be held to as high a standard of moral responsibility as others.
The majority in Johnson did not consider that allowing jury instruc-
tion on the mitigating factor of youth only as it related to future
dangerousness was a limitation per se on the consideration of mitigating
evidence. Thus, they found no violation of Lockett, Eddings or Penry.
Rather, citing Boyde, the majority held that states have some leeway in
posed to the jury adequately allows the jury to fully consider and give
effect to all aspects of youth was first raised before the United States
Supreme Court in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993). See case
summary of Graham, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 8 (1993).
However, as Graham was before the Court on collateral review, the
Court ruled that consideration of the issue was procedurally barred by the
rule established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that a
habeas petitioner may not create a new rule, nor employ a new rule from
a case decided after his case has reached final judgment, unless the rule
would (1) decriminalize a class of conduct or prohibit the imposition of
capital punishment on a particular class of people; or (2) involve the
creation of a watershed rule of criminal procedure).
8 Pemy, 492 U.S. at 320.
9 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (finding that the standard forjury instruction
on mitigation is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged jury instruction in a way that prevents the
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence). See case summary
of Boyde, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 11 (1990).
10 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2669.
11 Id. at 2670.
12 Id. at 2669-70.
13 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that sentencer
must not preclude presentation and consideration of evidence in mitiga-
tion that is relevant).
14 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,4 (1986)).
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shaping the way in which mitigating evidence is considered by the jury.
Johnson suggests several matters of importance to Virginia attor-
neys. First, this case teaches the importance of thorough investigation in
building a strong case in mitigation. 15 While the prosecution undertook
a full-scale investigation into the defendant's past and found evidence
relevant to future dangerousness in a multitude of occurrences from
relatively early childhood up to the time of the trial, the defense utilized
only the defendant's father, who testified about defendant's troubled
childhood and the impaired judgments of nineteen year-olds. The
father's testimony may have had some impact on the jurors, but the
defendant needed more to combat the damaging evidence presented by
the prosecution. Defense counsel must investigate every aspect of the
defendant's background, personality and lifestyle that may be useful as
mitigation evidence.
Virginia's capital sentencing scheme, like that of Texas, includes a
"future dangerousness" factor. 16 Virginia's sentencing scheme does not
require a mandatory death sentence upon the finding of aggravating
15 See Chipperfield, Preparing Mitigation Prior to Guilt Phase,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1,No.2, p. 19(1989). See also GeimerLaw
and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc.
Chan e, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 273 (1990-1991).
f6 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990).
17 The 1991 amendments to the Texas statute allow the jury to
sentence a defendant to life imprisonment even if all aggravating factors
factors, as did the former Texas statute. 17 If Virginia defense counsel
work to ensure that the jury is made aware, through argument and jury
instructions, and by presentation of a real case in mitigation, that it has
the option to impose a life sentence, then Johnson should not be an
impediment to defense practice in Virginia.
Because Virginia juries are free to set sentence at life in prison for
any reason satisfactory to themselves, the relevance problems at issue in
Johnson are simply not present. Although it is constitutionally imper-
missible to limit mitigating factors to those highlighted by the legislature,
it is still permissible for Virginia defense attorneys to offer jury instruc-
tions noting that the Virginia General Assembly has specifically recog-
nized youth as mitigating. I
8
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are found. Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. art. 37.071(2) (Vernon Supp.
1992-1993).
18 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(v) (1990). But Cf. Watkins
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469,331 S.E.2d 422 (1985) (holding consti-
tutional a verdict form that generally required the jury to consider
mitigation evidence, but specifically listed vileness and future danger-
ousness as aggravating factors).
DELO v. LASHLEY
113 S. Ct. 1222 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Seventeen year-old Frederick Lashley beat and stabbed to death his
physically impaired foster mother, Janie Tracy, during the course of a
robbery. Lashley was treated as an adult under Missouri law and was
convicted of capital murder. He was sentenced to death. 1
Before the penalty phase of Lashley's trial, one of his defense
attorneys requested that the jury be instructed on the mitigating circum-
stance that "[t]he defendant ha[d] no significant history of prior criminal
activity." 2 The defense attorney faced a difficult dilemma. The trial
judge had informed defense counsel that he would allow the prosecution
to introduce evidence of the defendant's juvenile record if the defense
team attempted to offer evidence that Lashley had no prior criminal
record.3 As a result, the defense attorney decided not to offer evidence
but still requested the instruction. The trial judge did not grant the
requested instruction.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the trial
judge not to give the instruction, reasoning that Missouri law requires
I Mo. Rev. Stat § 565.001 (Vernon 1979) (repealed Oct. 1, 1984).
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012.3(1) (Vernon 1979) (current version
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032.2(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993)).
3 This was error under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. §211.271
(Vernon 1983) (prohibiting the use of thejuvenile record for any purpose
in any proceeding other than a juvenile proceeding).
State v. Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712,714-15 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
5 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
mitigating instructions to be supported by evidence.4 Lashley's petition
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied.5 Lashley
then filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, but the claim was dismissed. 6 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief7 and held that the
failure to give the instruction was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment as interpreted in Lockett v. Ohio.8 The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that because there was no evidence of prior criminal activity,
the judge should have given the instruction.9
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that "to comply with due
process state courts need give jury instructions in capital cases only if the
evidence so warrants." 10 The Court went on to state that "[b]ecause the
jury heard no evidence concerning Lashley's prior criminal history, the
trialjudge did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction." I t1 Nor
did the Court accept the dissent's assertion that this holding would
6 Lashley v. Armontrout, No. 87-897(c)(2) (E.D.Mo., June 9,
1988).
7 Lashley v. Armontrout, 957 F.2d 1495 (1992).
8 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring that death penalty schemes allow
the jury to consider all mitigating factors).
9 957 F.2d at 1502.
10 Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct 1222, 1224 (1993) (citing Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982)).
11 Id. at 1225.
